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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RITA C. GUM,
*

Plaintiff and Appellant,

JAMES RICHARD GUM,
Defendant and Appellee.

*

Court of Appeals
Case No. 920164 CA

*

Priority No. 16

*

PETITION AND CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
Appellant Rita C. Gum, Pro Se, hereby petitions this Court for a
rehearing.

By her signature below, she hereby certifies that the petition

is presented to this Court in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay
disposition of this matter.
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Petitioner Rita C. Gum files this petition for rehearing.

In Cummings v.

Nielson. 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912), the Utah Supreme Court noted the
appropriate standard for filing a petition:
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of
right, and we have no desire to discourage the practice of
filing petitions for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a case, a rehearing should
not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or
overlooked some statute or decision which may affect
the result, or that we have based the decision on some
wrong principle of the law, or have either misapplied or
overlooked something which materially affects the

result . . .
If there are some reasons, however, such as
we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a
petition for a rehearing should be promptly filed and, if
it is meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized
by this court.
129 P. at 624.

This petition for rehearing meets the preceding standards

in both form and substance and should be granted for the reasons
discussed below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 21, 1993, this Court affirmed Appellant Gum's judgment.
The Court of Appeals' decision is attached; Addendum
Ms.

(A-1).

Gum has received no extension for filing this petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Factual statements are well covered in the two Briefs of Appellant
and the two Reply Briefs of Appellant in the two appeals which she has
filed in this case.
Appellant from the time she took charge of the case when her last
attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdrew has tried to get the Honorable John A.
Rokich to follow the Utah Code of Civil Procedure and receive her due
process.

Constitition of Utah, Article 1, Section 7.

It is difficult for the

Appellant to understand the prejudiced position of Judge Rokich even to
the point of not abiding the law in this case. She has pointed out these
errors in her filings with the court and in person, but they remain
uncorrected. To do so would serve justice as it should be. Why did the
judge disobey the law in this case?

Prejudice implies a preformed

judgment even more unreasoning than bias, and usually implies more
unreasoning than bias, and usually implies an unfavorable opinion.
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At the original trial the Honorable John A. Rokich made many biased
and prejudiced statements to this affiant which she brought to issue, in
her Briefs before the Utah Court of Appeals as shown in and off the record.
This bias was unjust and resulted in actions that constituted a clear
abuse of discretion and that he is so deeply prejudiced she could not have
a fair or impartial hearing or trial before him. This was the main reason
for the appeal; the Court not abiding the law.
Upon remand of the case to the District Court by the Utah Court of
Appeals, the Appellant filed an Affidavit of Prejudice.

There were months

of delay while Judge Rokich did not act upon this Affidavit.
The trial could not legally proceed until this matter was resolved,
as required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
While waiting on this matter, the Appellant filed REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on June 10, 1991. The case could not be ready
for trial until the discovery was completed.
The Appellee filed CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL in
September, 1991, stating, "... that opposing counsel have had reasonable
time to pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has been
completed."

The Discovery for the Appellant was never completed by the

Appellee. The counsel for the Appellee was also delaying the case.
The Appellee filed OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS, OCTOBER 17, 1991. Which was never acted upon by the judge.
There were now two legal reasons why they could not proceed with a
trial.

But the court did proceed-- illegally.
The record shows that this matter was referred by the assigned

judge under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to the presiding
judge, Dec. 03, 1991.
3

Judge Murphy's Order:
...."that the matter is referred back to the assigned judge for
resolution."
This Order has still not been complied with.

Therefore the

proceedings have never been completed-- legally.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
From the time that the Appellant took control of her case, Pro Se,
after her attorney, Mr. Spafford, withdraw, she has devoted a large portion
of the time contending with the Honorable John A. Rokich about his duty to
abide with the Utah Code of Civil Procedure.

Very little time was taken,

by the Court, covering the issues of the matters.
When Rita was unable to leave their home, as she had no money to
make the move, Mr. Spafford withdraw from her case.
In a letter to Rita, dated July 19, 1990,

he stated:

"I cannot endorse your decision to defy the Court Order, This
alone is a basis for Withdrawal."
Mr. Spafford should have appealed this illegal Order at that point,
and protected his client instead of withdrawing.

The appeal at this time

could have saved his client much time, money and heartache.
From this point on, the Court and the Attorney for the Appellee
committed illegal acts which caused the proceedings to be illegal.
It is these illegal acts that are addressed in these arguments as a
question of law.
The Amended Decree of Divorce as and determination by the Trial
Court was clearly erroneous.
Any certificate of readiness for trial which is served upon the
opposing party and filed with the clerk of the court in which discovery is
4

not complete prior to filing the certificate or in which discovery is not
complete prior to pretrial conference may be stricken and the trial date,
if assigned, may be vacated. Rule 4-104 (5), Code of Judicial
Administration. (Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
This is one of the reasons the Appellant did not appear at the
November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing which can be found to be clearly
erroneous, and should be vacated by this Court. She also believed that she
would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rokich; the Record of that
hearing proves she was right in her belief.
Appellant feels that this Court has misconstrued or overlooked these
statutes and decisions which have affected the result, or that they have
based the decision on some wrong principle of the law, or have either
misapplied or overlooked something which materially affects the result.
ARGUMENT I
THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE CONSTITUTED JUDICIAL
BIAS THROUGHOUT ALL THE PROCEEDINGS.
The first error in law the Honorable John A. Rokich made was a
biased and prejudiced Order for the Appellant to move from her home in
ten days, against her and the children's rights under Section 1, 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Appellant has found no

law whereby a judge can legally issue such an Order. The Court gave no
consideration to the circumstances of the Appellant and the minor
children; with the Appellee taking control of the bank accounts he had left
the family destitute.
TRANSCRIPT:
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.)
The Court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not where she's
going to go. [Emphasis added].

5

Q (By Mr. Spafford)

Why haven't you moved out?

A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have any money to go anyplace.
(Tr. p. 20, lines 2 -13 & A-52). [Emphasis added].
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can sort it out.
I told vou in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move out of the
house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be out. So, I'm
not convinced that the fact that she hasn't anv place to go is anv reason
that I should not enforce the order. So, you know-- (Tr. p. 25, lines 16 22 & A-54). [Emphasis added].
Had the court not prejudged and decided the issue before hearing the
testimony, and was not willing to take the time to hear the testimony or
weigh the circumstances as to what was fair and just?
In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520. 523 (1948) Justice
Wolfe, writing for the court, stated: The purity and integrity
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint
of suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have
the highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the
courts.' Justice Wade in a concurring opinion stressed this
point when he wrote: 'One of the most important things in
government is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall
always be able to maintain a fair and impartial trial in all
matters of litigation in the courts. It is nearly as important
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity of the
courts. I can think of nothing that would as surely bring the
courts into disrepute as for a judge to insist on trying a case
when one of the litigants believes that such judge is biased
and prejudiced against him'." Marchant v. Marchant 743 P.2d
199 (Utah App. 1987),
The Court ordered Appellant to move in the unreasonable time of ten
days and finally presented an unfair dilemma to the Appellant, "either
move or else

"
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The Appellant had offered to move if the Appellee gave her $3,000 to
move with. This was not done, and was later concured by the Court, along
with some of the furniture, to be a stipulation of settlement.
Appellee had offered an interest in their thrift plan but the

The
Honorable

John A. Rokich said in camera, of the $3,000, "That is all you're going to
get."
Defendant has agreed that any money additions accrued to his
retirement during the marriage of the parties should be divided equally
between the parties (p. 123, par. 9 - Record on Appeal).
The Appellant sold the home on H Street, of which the parties were
joint tenants, for One Hundred and Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000).
She had two appraisals of over Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000)
each.

But, with pressure from the Court she could not wait longer for the

right buyer.

The potential loss was over Eighty Thousand Dollars

($80,000).
Nothing was said about selling another home, at 5685 South 3650
West, Bennion, where James was living on his U.P Corporation Pension
Plan retirement of Three Thousand Ninety Five Dollars and 72 Cents
($3,095.72) per month.

This home is still owned by both parties.

The trial could not legally proceed until after the Presiding Judge
had held a hearing on the issue of judicial bias.

Appellant's claims of

judicial bias were not properly and appropriately determined before the
evidentiary hearing as required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(Brief of Appellant, A-3.)

Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is very clear in the
matter of disqualification of a judge:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceedings, civil or criminal,
or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before
7

whom such action or proceedings is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein,
except to call in another judge to hear and determine the matter. If the
judge against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of
the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be
forthwith certified to another iudae (naming hinrO of the same court or of
a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit [Emphasis added].
Judge John A. Rokich did proceed further therein, before calling in
another judge to hear and determine the matter:
The Court: And probably before you put on the testimony I think it
would be better if we locate the file and put it in the record and you can
come in some other time and take some testimony..
Mr. Richman: Can we preserve the testimony today?
The Court: Fine. That's Fine. You may.
Mr. Richman: I would like to also put on the record what happened.
(Transcript p. 11, line 7 to 15).
The file could not be located because there was none from Judge
Murphy.
The November 1, 1993 evidentiary hearing can be found to be clearly
erroneous, and this was one reason why Appellant did not appear. She also
believed that she would not receive a fair trial before Judge Rokich; the
Record of this hearing proves she was right in her belief.
ARGUMENT II
THE FINDINGS, DECREE, AND DETERMINATION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Any certificate of readiness for trial
opposing party and filed with the clerk of
not complete prior to filing the certificate
complete prior to pretrial conference may
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which is served upon the
the court in which discovery is
or in which discovery is not
be stricken and the trial date,

if assigned, may be vacated. Rule 4-104, Code of Judicial Administration.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
The Plaintiff filed REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on June
10, 1991. (Record 269)
The documents requested have never been delivered to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant filed CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR TRIAL in
September.

(Record 255)

The Defendant's counsel represented to the Court many statements
which he and the Defendant knew were not true.
The Plaintiff filed OBJECTIONS TO CERTIFICATION OF READINESS FOR
TRIAL on Sept. 18, 1991, in which she stated:
That Plaintiff acting as her own counsel has not completed all
discovery as this is being held in abeyance for the decision on Plaintiff's
Affidavit of Prejudice; and that all discovery has not been completed.
(Record 259)
In spite of these objections Judge Rokich issued an ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE on September 24, 1991. (Record 280)
This was in violation of Rule 4-104, Code of Judicial
Administration.

(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)

The Record was

before the Court and the discovery was not completed.
The Record clearly shows that the hearing was called for the
purpose of forcing the Plaintiff to court so that a trial date could be set.
The threat was:
"Further to show cause, if any she has, why visitation with the
minor child, Amy, should be not strictly defined by the Court and enforced
under sentence of contempt and sanctions.
The Court had turned it into a hearing for the divorce, and did not
consider the matter of custody of Amy.
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Ms. Gum: But, Sir, We're not ready to go to trial yet. I have to say
the Plaintiff is not ready to go to trial. The discovery is not in.
(Transcript p. 3, line 18 to 20).
The Appellant's and the children's constitutional rights to due
process of law were violated. The Court made biased and prejudiced
decisions without weighing the testimony.

Under what law or

authorization does the Court have this discretion?
none.

Plaintiff could find

If given to Court as a privilege it is open to or invites abuse.

It is elementary that there can be no judicial action affecting vested
rights that is not based upon some process or notice whereby the
interested parties are brought within the jurisdiction of the judicial
tribunal about to render judgment. Parrv v. Bonneville Irr. Dist.. 71 U. 202,
263 P. 751
The findings of fact are not sufficient to support the judgment of
the Court. The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law were again prepared
by the Defendant's attorney.

Many errors and omissions could be shown

but this will not be necessary as the entire proceedings were invalid.
The Defendant filed a belated OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on Oct. 17,1991. (Record 290)
Defendant, through counsel, Glen M. Richardson, objects to the
Request for Production of Documents submitted by Plaintiff. Under the
status of the matter, further discovery is not required and is not
appropriate.
Plaintiff had filed REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, June
10, 1991. Four months earlier.

(Record 269)

Further discovery was necessary and required for the Appellant's
case to proceed properly and to find what other property the Appellee
might be hiding from her.
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ARGUMENT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIVIDING ALL THE MUTUAL
PROPERTY IN A MORE EQUITABLE MANNER, INCLUDING A SECOND
HOME WHICH IS STILL OWNED AS JOINT TENNANTS BY THE
PARTIES; AN ISSUE NEVER SETTLED.
TRANSCRIPT:
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.)
Proffer by Mr, Spafford as follows:
Mr. Spafford: Let me make a proffer, your honor, to save a lot of
time.
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns $3,000
month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P, which is
the home they're living in. It is owned jointly bv them, and while
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage
from marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to
her jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property.
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the lot 72,
Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two parties
jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in the
second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it, (A-31).
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's living
in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of property,
two homes [Emphasis added]
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a poverty
level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two separate
pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of property
while she's effectively put out on the street (Tr. p. 20, 21 -25; p. 21, 1 20 & A-52). [Emphasis added]
Both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy.
In the Arizona case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz.
248 (Ariz. 1975).

it is stated:

Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by trial court in divorce.
A.R.S. § 25-318.

1 1

In making a division of marital property in a divorce proceeding, the
trial Court is governed by general principles of equity.

Title 30 Chapter 3,

Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d
1248.
To abide with the law, this home should be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties.

Any way that it should resolved, it

needs to be resolved.
ARGUMENT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND SHOULD HAVE AWARDED
PLAINTIFF HER COSTS AND FEES.
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Annotated.

(1984) provides that a trial

court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce action. Rita C. Gum
was financially unable to pay the fees and costs, Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d
417, 419 (Utah 1986).
This Court in the recent case of Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331
(Utah App. 1988) found that under the Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-3
that on remand the Trial Court should also determine the Appellant's need
for Respondent's payment of her attorney's fees incurred in the appeal and
that if a financial need were adequately shown that the Trial Court could
take evidence regarding a reasonable fee in making such an order pursuant
to that statute.
Under Utah code Annotated Section 30-3-3 and Heltman v. Heltman.
511 P.2d 720 (Utah 1973) this Court should consider this appeal and so
order.
In the case of Fife v. Fife 479 P. 2d 560, 3 Wash.App. 726 (Wash.App.
1970),. the court stated:
Where wife had, when divorce action was commenced, no
assets on which to draw for payment of attorney's fees and
costs, fact that she would receive assets when litigation was
finally terminated was not test of whether attorney's fees
12

should be allowed, and award to wife of $10,000 for attorney's
fees for services rendered in unraveling and establishing
community interest in over 10 years of transactions, both
inside and outside husband's business pursuit, and $1,800 for
costs with which to pay wife's accountant was not an abuse of
discretion.
Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees for
being forced to file this action, (p. 4 par. 15 - Record on Appeal).
Rita C. Gum respectfully submits that where she has a continuing
need and James Richard Gum's income far exceeds her own, she should
have been awarded a reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred in the
Trial Court as well as in the bringing of her appeal.
ARGUMENT V
THE DENIAL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN AND
ENTITLEMENT PERTAINING TO DEFENDANT'S BENEFIT PLANS,
RETIREMENT PLANS, THRIFT PLANS, SAVINGS, STOCK PLANS OR
ANY OTHER BENEFIT PLAN WHATSOEVER WAS AN ERROR IN LAW.
A pension being considered as marital property (Woodward v.
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), a portion of Respondent's monthly
pension benefits should be considered as an entitlement of Appellant.
The Utah Supreme Court in the oft cited case of Woodward v.
Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), specifically held, citing an earlier
case of Enalert v. Enalert. 576 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1978) as follows:
. . . We emphasize the equitable nature of proceedings dealing
with the family, pointing out that the court may take into
consideration all of the pertinent circumstances. These
circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived; and that this includes any such
pension fund or insurance". M, at 1276. To the extent that
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the ability of the court to
consider all of the parties' assets and circumstances,
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including retirement and pension rights, it is expressly
overruled.
In the immediate case at hand in the Trial Brief:
3.
The defendant is willing to divide equally any retirement
earned during the parties' marriage or accruing during the parties
marriage.
A review of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, fails to
disclose any consideration by the Trial Court of the retirement benefits or
a consideration of a division of that property as a marital asset accrued
during the parties marriage of 10 years. The Court did find the income of
the Appellee including his retirement to be $39,132 and did not address
the retirement as income to the Appellant, and failed to make any
distribution of that retirement as a marital asset or marital property in
the distribution thereof.

The retirement accumulated should be treated as

a marital asset and as personal property to be considered by the Court in
the division of the property.
Based upon the above and foregoing points of law, the fact that the
retirement is a marital asset and should be distributed equitably and the
Trial Court's failure to delineate through its findings of fact as required
by Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's treatment of
that marital asset, the findings should be better delineated by another
trial court.
CONCLUSION
Because the Honorable John A. Rokich did not abide by the law as
required under Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-104
(5), Code of Judicial Administration.

(Amended effective January 15,

1990.), and that Appellant did not receive her due process as protected by
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the courts.

Appellant feels that this Court has misconstrued or

overlooked these statutes and other decisions which have affected the
result, or that they have based the decision on some wrong principle of the
law, or have either misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result.
The Appellant is entitled to a new trial.

It should be based on the

May 23, 1991 Order in the Utah Court of Appeals which was not followed
by the Trial Court.
She is also entitled to due process of law and a fair trial.
If the failure to recognize the Order from the first appeal and the
Trial Court's errors in this case and the reconsideration of those issues
set fort in that previous Order was an oversight, the Order should be
amended to remand for reconsideration.

If this Court intentionally did not

remand the case for some reason, the Order should be amended to explain
the basis for the denial.
DATED this 7th day of July, 1993.

/f^ZCU

is '

Rita C. Gum, Pro Se
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies of the
Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiff-Appellant to be served upon DefendantAppellee by hand-delivering same to the following counsel of record on
this 7th day of July, 1993:
GLEN M. RICHMAN, ESQ. (2752)
RICHMAN & RICHMAN
Attorney for Defendant - Respondent
60 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-8844

E. O'Dell WoodS
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- -r.:^ Court

Rita C. Gum,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No. 920164-CA
v.
James Richard Gum,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Orme (Rule 31).
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Dated this ^}

day of June, 1993.

N6rman H. Ja^Kson, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood,_Judge

Gregory-- k^Qtme,

Judge

